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INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
THE GASOLINE PRICE WARS: A CASE STUDY OF THE
SHORTCOMINGS OF THE MANDATORY PROCESS
The retail distribution of gasoline is probably marked by more price
wars than any other distributive trade in the nation.' In order to pre-
vent the entire economic cost of these price disturbances from falling on
the independent retail dealers, suppliers throughout the industry have
selectively reduced their prices to those retailers engaged in price wars.
Because of the serious legal problems involved, particularly those of price
discrimination, and because of the potential adverse effect on competi-
tion, this industry-wide practice of granting selective price assistance has
been attacked by the Federal Trade Commission in a number of cases.
In analyzing the Commission's handling of the price war problem
through the application of section 2 of the Robinson-Patman Acte and
section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act,3 particular attention will
be paid to The Pure Oil case,4 FTC v. Sun Oil Co.,' The American Oil
case6 and The Atlantic Refining case.' Using these cases as analytical
tools, a lack of consistency in the case by case approach to solving indus-
1. CASSADY, PRICE MAKING AND PRICE BEHAVIOR IN THE PETROLEUI INDUSTRY 262
(1954).
2. Clayton Act § 2, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1958), amending 38
Stat. 730 (1914).
3. FTC Act § 5(a) (1), 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1)
(1958).
4. No. 6640, FTC, TRADE REG. REP. 16111 (Sept. 28, 1962).
5. No. 6641, FTC, 371 U.S. 505 (1963), reversing 294 F.2d 465 (5th Cir. 1961).
6. No. 8183, FTC, TRADE REG. REP. 1 15961 (June 27, 1962).
7. No. 7471, FTC, TRADE REG. REP. 1 15786 (March 7, 1962). It should be pointed
out at the outset that these complaints were issued over a period of five years, during
which time the personnel of the Federal Trade Commission and its staff underwent
considerable change. Therefore, any comments pertaining to the Commission refer to
it as an institution rather than being directed at any individual or group of individuals
who were or presently are a part of that institution.
There are a number of inherent problems in attempting to analyze cases at various
stages of litigation. This note is primarily concerned with what the Commission has
done to cure the price war problem. With this in mind, emphasis is placed on what has
been done at the various stages of the Commission procedure even though most of these
cases have not been finally determined.
The emphasis was placed on these four particular cases because it was felt that they
present a cohesive unit. Other cases dealing with price war problems include: In the
Matter of Texas Co., No. 6898, FTC, TRADE REo. REP 1 16207 (Dec. 1, 1962) ; In the
Matter of Sun Oil Co., No. 6934, FTC, TRADE REG. REP. 1[ 15909 (May 17, 1962); In
the Matter of Standard Oil Co., No. 7567, FTC, TRADE REG. REP. 11 16128 (Oct. 5,
1962) ; In the Matter of Shell Oil Co., No. 8537, FTC, TRADE REG. REP. 1 16132 (Oct.
16, 1962) ; In the Matter of Crown Central Petroleum Co., No. 8539, FTC, TRADE REG.
REP. ff 16148 (Oct. 19, 1962); In the Matter of Humble Oil & Refining Co., No. 8544,
FTC, TRADE REG. REP. 9 16168 (Nov. 5, 1962).
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try wide problems, as well as a failure to provide the industry with the
direction needed for self-regulation, will be pointed out. Finally, certain
tentative proposals for a comprehensive enforcement program in this
area will be advanced. In order to facilitate an examination of the Com-
mission's efforts, however, it is necessary briefly to examine the struc-
ture of the petroleum industry.
I. STRUCTURE OF THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY
The process of changing the characteristics and location of crude
oil in the ground to those of gasoline in the consumers' tanks is generally
divided into four distinct phases-production, transportation, refining
and marketing.' The occurrence, intensity and duration of a price war
is usually dependent on factors in all phases of the industry. The supply
and cost of crude, the availability of transportation facilities and the
volume of refinery runs are but a few of the complex and often inter-
dependent elements that might affect a particular price disturbance. Pri-
marily, however, price disturbances are a reaction to conditions in the
marketing segment of the industry, and emphasis will be placed on the
structure of that phase.
The industry is generally divided into the major oil companies and
the private brands or non-major companies. The line between the two,
however, is not a clearly defined one. The majors appear to stress ad-
vertising, credit facilities and a more complete line of service. The non-
majors, on the other hand, often dispense with lubrication and washing
facilities, deal strictly on a cash basis and depend heavily on curbside
price advertising. As with most generalizations, however, this over-
simplifies the situation. Many small operators offer the same service as
a large operation. Some medium size firms utilize credit cards. Some
of the smaller firms conduct extensive advertising within their trade
areas. There appears to be no single test by which the majors can be
distinguished from the non-majors. Nevertheless, where it is necessary
to draw this distinction the twenty largest firms will be referred to as
majors and all others will be considered non-majors.
The petroleum industry is marked by widespread vertical integra-
tion. Perhaps as many as fifty-four companies, including almost all of
the majors, operate in all four phases. A few hundred more operate in
S. LINDAHL & CARTER, CORPORATE CONCENTRATION AND PUBLIC POLICY 341 (3d
ed. 1959).
9. This distinction is apparently drawn by a number of authors, and the list has re-
mained unchanged since at least 1939. Compare COOK, CONTROL OF THE PETROLEUM Ix-
DUSTRY BY MAJOR OIL COMPANIES 3 (TNEC Monograph No. 39, 1941) with LINDAHL
& CARTER, op. cit. supra note 8, at 341.
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two or three phases."0 Because of this integration, the industry has
taken on the oligopolistic pattern found in many of the principal indus-
tries, with a moderate number of large firms supplying a substantial part
of the output, plus many small firms."
The marketing phase of the industry can be roughly divided into the
wholesaling and the retailing operations. Some refiners sell directly to
the service stations, performing their own wholesaling function. Others
sell to independent wholesalers, usually referred to as jobbers, who then
resell to the service stations. Some refiners have commission agents
who perform their wholesaling functions. In some cases, the retailer
is large enough to perform his own wholesaling function. Still another
arrangement is for the wholesaler to operate his own retail outlets in
addition to selling to other retailers. Often, a combination of these
methods will be employed by the refiner within the same market area.
The retail level of the marketing phase also presents a mixed pic-
ture. In the 1920's the major oil companies owned and operated most
of their own retail outlets. However, a combination of severe price
cutting, the growth of chain store taxes and the increasing responsibility
of employers under the press of unionization and welfare legislation
caused a widespread adoption of the "Iowa Plan" of leasing stations out
to independent operators. One recent writer says:
Service stations today may be divided into five groups and
the number in each roughly estimated as follows: (1) over
3,000 owned by suppliers and run by salaried managers; (2)
about 8,000 of the new and rapidly growing "commission type"
stations run as independent businesses except that they buy their
gasoline on consignment thus giving the supplier control over
prices; (3) some 90,000 more or less, which are leased by the
supplier-usually a refiner, but often a jobber and occasionally
the owner of a chain of stations-to the operator, subject to
cancellation for unsatisfactory performance; (4) perhaps 15,-
000 or 20,000 leased by the dealer from a third party; and
10. I WHITNEY, ANTITRUST POLICIES-AMERICAN EXPERIENCE IN TWENTY INDUS-
TRIES 95 (1958).
11. For a statistical delimitation of what constitutes an oligopolistic market struc-
ture see KAYSEN & TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY-AN ECONOMIc AND LEGAL ANALYSIS
26-29 (1959). It is difficult to apply this analysis to the petroleum industry in general,
but it can be accomplished at the various phases within the industry. For example,
WHITNEY, op. cit. supra note 10, at 98, indicates that the eight largest firms control at
least 57.9% of the domestic refinery crude runs, and the largest twenty firms control
82.7%. Under the Kaysen & Turner analysis, this would constitute a Type One oligopoly
in that line of commerce; with whatever moral, economic or legal implications that
might entail.
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(5) the remaining 60,000 or so which are on land and premises
owned by the dealer himself. 2
Thus, according to these estimates, only about two per cent of the sta-
tions are owned and operated by the majors." Those remaining are
classified as independent businesses, but because of the control in their
short-term contract arrangements, the term independent may be some-
what of a misnomer with reference to those stations carrying a supplier's
branded products.
When a service station dealer arranges to market a particular brand
of gasoline, he more or less joins the family. Storage tanks and dis-
pensing pumps are usually furnished by the supplier at a nominal charge,
and the dealer is legally precluded from dispensing any other brand of
gasoline from these pumps."4 In addition, prior to 1948 the industry was
marked by the widespread use of exclusive dealing contracts. Under
these, the independent dealers would agree to purchase their entire re-
quirements of petroleum products and tires, batteries and accessories
(TBA) from their oil company supplier or its designee. Although these
agreements were held to violate both the Sherman Act and the Clayton
Act in United States v. Standard Oil Co. and Standard Stations, Inc.,'5
there are indications that the use of informal pressures, threats and other
forms of coercion by the suppliers has met with considerable success in
retaining a substantial volume of their dealers' business. 6 Even in the
12. WHITNEY, op. cit. supra note 10, at 126. It should be pointed out that this sur-
vey includes approximately 181,000 service stations and is based on 1956 data. More
recent compilations indicate a higher number of stations without determining any cate-
gory distribution. See U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMIERcE, STATISTICAL AB-
STRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 831 (1962), which sets the 1958 number of stations at
206,302.
13. The main reasons given for the majors' retaining ownership and operation of
some stations are for use as models for other retail outlets carrying their brand, as ex-
perimental or training facilities to test new equipment or train personnel, or as a source
of profits, WHITNEY, op. cit. supra note 10, at 125. It appears, however, that another
reason may be to retain a direct influence on the retail pricing of their gasoline. See
Learned, Pricing of Gasoline: A Case Study, 26 HARV. Bus. REv. 723, 728 (1948).
14. FTC v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 261 U.S. 436 (1923). The opinion by Mr. Justice
McReynolds pointed up that this arrangement permits entry at the retail level without a
heavy capital outlay, thus increasing competition. In addition, the opinion reasoned,
nothing prevented a shift in suppliers or even a duplication of suppliers by leasing
pumps from two of them. The opinion has been called "supremely unrealistic" for ig-
noring the fact that a shift of this nature represents a major policy step for a station, is
difficult and expensive, and is not likely to be accomplished without controversy.
ROSToW, A NATIONAL POLICY FOR THE OIL INDUSTRY 74 (1948). Insofar as the case
indicates that a dealer could handle competing brands by leasing pumps from competing
suppliers, it is probably unrealistic since 85-95% of the motorists are opposed to such
"split-pump" stations. WHITNEY, op. cit. supra note 10, at 130.
15. 78 F. Supp. 850 (S.D. Cal. 1948), affd, 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
16. Interviews. (Some of the material for this note was obtained through inter-
views with service station dealers in various trade areas. Since the information was
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absence of such pressures, it is often more economical for a dealer to
centrally purchase his TBA from his supplier than it would be to pur-
chase from a number of independent sources. The oil family is also held
closely together by the Suppliers' furnishing credit facilities, signs, paint,
emblems and other incidentals with a view to establishing uniformity in
their dealers' stations and methods of operation. This uniformity also
enables the dealer to utilize the reputation and advertising of the supplier
to attract and retain customers on the basis of brand preferences. In the
case of a major oil company's dealer, this brand preference built up by
the major represents a substantial business asset.
In addition to those retail outlets that are owned by a supplier or are
made a part of the branded supplier's family, there are a number of in-
dependent retail operations. These stations purchase unbranded gasoline
from the refiner or wholesaler from whom they can obtain the best
prices. They then sell at retail under their own brand name.
One further aspect of the retail level of the industry that should be
noted is that, in many cases, a retail owner will operate more than one
station. Such an arrangement is known as a chain operation and con-
stitutes horizontal integration. Chain operations are found among both
branded and unbranded retailers.
II. THE PRICE WAR PROBLEM
The factors which cause price wars are difficult of assessment and
are not subject to generalization. In some cases it can be determined that
an over-supply of refined gasoline weakened the market price. In others,
the opening of a new station might cause a general price reduction by
others in the area. Probably there are cases in which the argumentative
disposition of a single person touched off the conflict. Because of the
many factors involved, no attempt will be made to determine the causes
of the wars. However, in order to evaluate the Commission's attempts
to cope with price wars, an elementary examination of the economics in-
volved is desirable.
In the interests of clarity, the economist's tool of an over-simplified,
unrealistic model will be used to demonstrate the role of the various
parties involved in a price war. It is easiest to start with a retail market
"not for attribution" or "off the record," these sources will be cited as in this instance.
Because of the inherent limitations involved in this type of information, it will be used
sparingly.) The pressure referred to by the service station dealers has resulted in a
number of cases, lending credence to these statements. See Osborn v. Sinclair Refining
Co., 286 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1961); U.S. "v. Sun Oil Co., 176 F. Supp. 715 (E.D. Pa.
1959); U.S. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 99 F. Supp. 280 (S.D. Cal. 1951), aff'd, 343 U.S.
922 (1952).
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in which each filling station is owned by a separate independent business-
man, who has no other substantial source of income and who sells only
unbranded gasoline. The owner buys his gasoline from a supplier at the
going tank wagon price in his geographic area. He is then free to set
whatever retail price he selects. However, because gasoline is a fungible
product which is almost indistinguishable by the consumer," the dealer
cannot successfully charge consumers more than any other dealer except
insofar as the higher price compensates him for more advertising or
superior service. Conversely, there is no need for the dealer to charge
less than a competitor except to make up to his customer for inferior
service.
In this model situation, each dealer has a limited range of price
competition. In the long run, the lower limit of his pricing ability is his
average total cost including the tank wagon price, overhead and a fair
return on his investment. If he consistently prices his product below
this, the business will prove unprofitable and he will be forced to close.
In the short run, he can sell below the tank wagon price only so long as
his liquid assets and his credit enable him to purchase more gasoline.
If a price war were to occur in this model retail market, the economic
power of competing dealers is so evenly balanced that no one dealer could
afford a severe reduction for very long. Therefore, the intensity and
duration of price wars would be considerably less than they are in actual
practice. In addition, since in our model all other dealers could match
any price reduction in their competitive area, the tendency for price wars
to start would be greatly lessened. Only a price reduction which re-
flected a more efficient and cost saving mode of operation would be
likely to occur. This would then compel the other dealers either to re-
tain their old prices while losing customers, to reduce their prices and
their profit margins or to reduce their prices and adopt the more efficient
mode of operation. This is the essence of a textbook competitive market.
To the theoretical model, we must now add some realistic factors.
In the first place, the model should be altered to include a horizontally
integrated chain of retail service stations, with some of the stations lo-
cated inside and some outside a particular market. In a price war situa-
tion confined to a single geographic market, the owner of the chain could
maintain higher prices at his stations outside the price war area. The
profits from these unaffected stations could then be utilized to enhance
the price war ability of the affected stations. In the long run, the lower
17. Interviews. See Hearings Before the TNEC, 76th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 15, at
8385-86 (1939).
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limit of the chain's pricing ability is still the average total cost. But, in
the short run, the staying power of the station within the affected area
is increased by the liquid assets and borrowing ability of the chain. This
two-price policy could give the chain operation a sufficient advantage to
drive its competitors out of business in the affected market.
The Supreme Court, however, has held that this two-price policy,
involving transactions in interstate commerce, constitutes price discrim-
ination and is unlawful under section 2 (a) of the Robinson-Patman Act
where it has or threatens to have adverse effects on competition on the
seller's side of the market."8 In such a primary line situation, the illegal
price differential is found in the horizontally integrated seller charging
a lower price to those dealers located within the affected market. The
violation of the Act is found not in injury to his dealers who are in dif-
ferent relevant markets, but in the injury to competing sellers. Thus,
if the required interstate commerce is involved, the only price reduction
which the chain operation could lawfully make would be a uniform one or
one which reflected different competitive factors in the several markets.
The model may also be altered to include a refiner-supplier who sells
only to independent retail dealers located within a particular area. If
the supplier lowers his price to some of these retailers, while maintaining
the higher price to the rest, the favored dealers will have a substantial
competitive advantage over the non-favored. The economic burden of
a price war on sales through them is, in effect, shifted from them to the
supplier, while the non-favored dealers continue to bear the entire burden
themselves.
However, the Supreme Court has held that this two-price policy con-
stitutes price discrimination which is unlawful under section 2(a) of the
Robinson-Patman Act because of its effects on the secondary, or buyers,
level of competition. 9 Thus, the only price reduction which the refiner-
supplier could lawfully make would be a general price reduction to all of
18. See, e.g., Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115 (1954). Where the
gasoline was produced or purchased in one state and sold only to local stations from a
bulk plant located in a second state, it has been held to be a transaction in the course of
interstate commerce. Alabama Independent Serv. Ass'n v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 28
F. Supp. 386 (N.D. Ala. 1939). Contra, Lewis v. Shell Oil Co., 50 F. Supp. 547 (N.D.
II1. 1943). Where, however, the goods are produced and sold within a state, the require-
ments of the Robinson-Patman Act are not satisfied in spite of the essentially interstate
nature of the defendant's business. Willard Dairy Corp. v. National Dairy Prods. Corp.,
309 F.2d 943 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied 31 U.S.L. WEEK 3389 (U.S. May 27, 1963)
(Black, J., dissenting). Also, where the purchasers are subsequently using the products
in interstate commerce, it has been held that the defendant was selling in the course of
interstate commerce in a primary line case, Bowman Dairy Co. v. Hedlin Dairy Co.,
126 F. Supp. 749 (N.D. Ill. 1954), and in a secondary line case, American Can Co. v.
Ladoga Canning Co., 44 F.2d 763 (7th Cir. 1930).
19. See, e.g., FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948).
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its customers in the relevant market. Because any such price concession
would probably be matched by other sellers in the market, it would be
granted only when it resulted in the maximum obtainable profit. There-
fore, it would be undertaken only when it reflected cost savings or a
response to supply-demand factors, and other sellers would have to fol-
low suit or suffer a competitive disadvantage.
To add in two additional factors, assume that a supplier sells to cus-
tomers both inside and outside a particular market, and sells only branded
gasoline. If a price war occurs in the market and the supplier lowers his
price to all of the retail dealers there, while maintaining a higher price
to those outside, he is, in effect, bearing the economic cost of the price
war for his favored dealers. However, the profits from the non-favored
dealers continue to give a competitive advantage over the supplier who
operates only in the price war area. The favored dealers, all of whom
receive the same price concession from the supplier, have a competitive
advantage over other dealers in the market who are unable to secure
similar concessions from their suppliers.
This does not fit the standard example of primary line price discrim-
ination because there is no direct competition between suppliers in selling
gasoline to branded retail dealers. No other supplier is competing for
the business of these same retailers. Moreover, it does not fit the stand-
ard example of secondary line price discrimination because the non-
favored dealers of this supplier are located outside the price war market
and suffer no competitive disadvantage. An effect on competing dealers
is present only if the favored dealers pass on the price concession in the
form of lower retail prices, and the effect is initially manifested against
the competitors of the customer-retailer, not those of the seller-supplier.
The competitive result of this lower retail price can be imputed to the
supplier only if it was a forseeable result of the suppliers' price reduction.
For want of a better description, this may be referred to as a third-line
price discrimination with no legal implications being intended."0 Unless
legal responsibility for the lower retail price is imputed to the supplier,
his price differential does not contravene the specific injury language of
the Robinson-Patman Act which proscribes price differentials which
"injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either
grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with
customers of either of them," since the only direct effect is to increase
20. For a discussion of "third-line" price discrimination in a distinguishable con-
text see RowE, PRIcE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 195-205
(1962). The Supreme Court has referred to "tertiary-line competition" without defin-
ing the term. FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536, 543 (1960).
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the profit margin of his retailers. It can perhaps, however, be attacked
under that part of section 2(a) which prohibits discriminations where
the effect "may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a
monopoly in any line of commerce," under the assumption that the price
concession may be passed on in the form of lower retail prices, to the
detriment of competition generally in the retailing and/or wholesaling
of gasoline.
The model may be altered further by considering a firm which is
vertically integrated to embrace the refining and marketing phases, with
all of its stations located within a particular market area and which does
not sell to any other retailers. This type of firm can utilize the profits
normally attributable to its jobber and refinery operations to enhance the
price war ability of its retail outlets. If competing retail dealers are un-
able to obtain price concessions from their suppliers, the vertically in-
tegrated firm can use this competitive advantage against competing
dealers. The use of its power in the market in this manner may under
some circumstances be attacked under section 2 of the Sherman Act or
section 5 of the FTC Act. However, where the firm merely uses its
size to gain a larger share of the market, it is difficult to prove that
there has been a violation of either act.
The factors just outlined indicate that the independent retailer,
when left alone, has a severely limited ability to engage in price warfare.
The vertically or horizontally integrated firm, drawing on its other
operations, has a much larger potential price war ability. Those sup-
pliers who sell to the independent retailers realize that in a price war the
independent may be forced out of business, closing the suppliers' access
to the consumer at that location, unless the independent receives assis-
tance. This has been a primary factor in prompting the suppliers to
grant competitive price allowances (CPAs) to their retailers in order to
put them on a more equal competitive basis with the integrated firms.
The CPAs usually result in a tank wagon price to the dealer which is
equal to the retail price level in the price war market, minus a minimum
dealer margin.2' In this way, the economic strength of the supplier is
21. For a detailed analysis of the price determination process in the absence of a
price war see Learned, supra note 13, at 728-65; RosTow, op. cit. supra note 14, at 76;
and WHEITNEY, op. cit. supra note 10, at 158-59.
A more modern price determining process can be seen in the recent FTC litigation
against Standard Oil Company (Ind.). The Commission is attacking a "Suggested
Competitive Retail Price" plan (SCRP) under section 5 of the FTC Act. Under the
plan, Standard surveys the prevailing retail price levels of various classes of the non-
major retailers, taking into account the value of stamps, discounts, premiums and other
give-aways. Standard then determines a price differential between major and non-major
products as a class, reflecting the difference in public acceptance.
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ranged behind the retailer in the price war situation.
The practice of this supplier-dealer team warfare magnifies the un-
desirable economic, social and legal consequences of cutthroat competi-
tion by large units. As a result, even more severe price cutting takes
place. The effect may be especially harmful where the economic strength
being made available to the dealer is that of a firm which is far greater
than that of the integrated retailer. Rather than eliminating the im-
balance of economic power problem that would exist if the dealer were
made to face the competition of an integrated supplier-dealer unaided,
the supplier-dealer team warfare merely shifts the power advantage, and
probably increases the resulting disparity. The major oil company and
its dealers, acting together, may have sufficient power to control the fate
of all of the non-majors in the particular market. Into this somewhat
complicated situation steps the Federal Trade Commission, armed with
two vague and difficult statutes and charged with preserving competition.
III. THE STATUTES TO BE APPLIED
The tools which the Commission has available to deal with the price
war situations are section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act and
section 2 of the Clayton Act, commonly referred to as the Robinson-
Patman Act. In pertinent part, the former declares: "Unfair methods
of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in
commerce, are hereby declared unlawful."22  The thrust of the statute
appears to be two-fold. The act is designed to attack, in their incipiency,
those attempts to eliminate competition which threaten to or have be-
come Sherman Act violations.23 At the same time, the act is designed to
regulate the plane of competition by preventing unfair trade practices.
The language employed by the act is general, making it a flexible ad-
ministrative tool designed to cope with new practices not envisioned by
the Congress when it passed the act.2"
From these, Standard computes a suggested competitive retail price for its products.
Its price to its dealers is determined by taking a percentage discount frdm the SCRP,
excluding taxes. All Standard dealers in the market area are then charged the same
price, regardless of their pump price.
The initial decision by the hearing examiner dismissed the complaint on finding no
agreement or coercion used to insure Standard that the suggested price would be posted.
When dealers posted at other prices, Standard took no action against them. In the
Matter of Standard Oil Co., No. 7567, FTC TRADE REG. REP. 1 16128 (Oct. 27, 1962).
22. FTC Act § 5(a) (1), 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1)
(1958).
23. FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 708 (1948).
24. For a discussion of the legislative history and the subsequent development of
the Act through case law see Beker and Baum, Section 5 of the Federal Trade Comuzis-
sion Act: A Conthutng Process of Redefinition, 7 VILL. L. REV. 517 (1962).
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
The Robinson-Patman Act, on the other hand, is much more spe-
cific than the FTC Act. Enacted as an amendment to the Clayton Act,
it reads in pertinent part:
§ 2 (a). It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in com-
merce, in the course of such commerce . . . to discriminate in
price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade
and quality . . . where the effect of such discrimination may
be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a mo-
nopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or pre-
vent competition with any person who either grants or know-
ingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with cus-
tomers of either of them . . . provided . . . That nothing
. . . shall prevent price changes from time to time where in
response to changing conditions affecting the market for or the
marketability of the goods concerned, such as but not limited to
actual or imminent deterioration of perishable goods, absoles-
cence or seasonal goods, distress sales under court process, or
sales in good faith in discontinuance of business in the goods
concerned.
§ 2(b). Upon proof being made . . . that there has
been discrimination in price . . . the burden of rebutting the
prima facie case thus made by showing justification shall be
upon the person charged with a violation of this section . . .
Provided, however, That nothing . . . shall prevent a seller
rebutting the prima facie case thus made by showing that his
lower price ... to any purchaser or purchasers was made in good
faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor. 2
The act is written in terms of price discrimination. The Supreme
Court has held that an unlawful price discrimination is a price differen-
tial in the course of interstate commerce which does or may substantially
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce,
or injure, destroy or prevent competition with any person who either
grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with
customers of either of them.2" In an earlier case, the Supreme Court
held that in cases involving competition between buyers, this proscribed
effect may be inferred from a showing that the seller has charged one
25. 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1958), amending 38 Stat. 730 (1914).
For an entertaining view of the problems confronting the businessman and his
lawyer under the Robinson-Patman Act see De Bevoice, Problems of Pricing, in A.B.A.
ANT ANTITRUST HANDBOOK 33 (1958).
26. FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536 (1960).
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purchaser a substantially higher price han he has charged a competing
purchaser." Since a substantial competitive advantage is inherent in
even a minor cost advantage in a fungible product such as gasoline, a
price discrimination could be inferred from a seller's charging different
prices to dealers in the same market area.
Section 2(a) contains the changing conditions defense, which pro-
tects the seller who reduces his price in particular markets from time to
time in response to changing conditions affecting the market for or the
marketability of the goods concerned. The courts, however, have limited
the scope of this provision to situations closely related to those listed in
the statute as examples, e.g., imminent deterioration of perishable goods,
obsolescence of seasonal goods, distress sales under court process or
sales in good faith in discontinuance of business in the goods concerned.28
The section 2(b) proviso provides that a prima fade case of price
discrimination may be rebutted by showing that the lower price was of-
fered in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor. While
the language may appear to deal with procedural burdens, the Supreme
Court has held that the specified showing establishes an absolute de-
fense.2 ' However, the proviso has been interpreted to mean that a seller
is not meeting competitive prices, but is beating them by rducing his
price to the level of a competitor's when the competitor's product nor-
mally sells at a lower price."0 In addition, the equally low price of a
competitor which may be met has been interpreted to mean the equally
low lawful price."' Thus, in order to establish the defense provided for
27. FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948).
28. Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 231 F.2d 356, 369 (9th Cir. 1955),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 991 (1956) ; Moore v. Mead Serv. Co., 190 F2d 540, 541 (10th
Cir. 1951). For a criticism of this narrow view see ATr'Y GEN. NAT'L Comm. ANTITRUST
REP. 178-79 (1955).
29. Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231 (1951).
30. Standard Motor Prods. v. FTC, 265 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1959) ; FTC v. Standard
Brands, Inc., 189 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1951); Porto Rican Am. Tobacco Co. v. American
Tobacco Co., 30 F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 1929). Contra, Sunshine Biscuit Co. v. FTC, 306
F.2d 48 (7th Cir. 1962). The Commission has publicly announced that it intends to
continue to follow the Second Circuit ban on aggressive price matching, 72 B.N.A. ANTI-
TRUST TRADE RE. REP. A-2 (Nov. 27, 1962).
31. FTC v. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746 (1945); Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340
U.S. 231 (1951). Mr. Justice Frankfurter evidenced much the same sentiment when he
said "There is no constitutional right to employ retaliation against action outlawed by
a state." Safeway Store v. Oklahoma Retail Grocers Ass'n, 360 U.S. 334, 336-37
(1959). The Fifth and Ninth Circuits have refused to interpret the Staley and Standard
cases as adding the lawful requirement to § 2(b). Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden
Farms Co., 231 F.2d 356, 366 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 999 (1956);
Standard Oil Co. v. Brown, 238 F.2d 54, 58 (5th Cir. 1956).
It is interesting to note in passing that even the detailed plan of fair competition
developed for the industry under the N.I.R.A. permitted a refiner, distributor, jobber,
wholesaler or retailer to violate the sale below cost provision in order to meet the com-
petition of a violator of the Act. The only requirement imposed was that he must file
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in section 2(b), the respondent must show that he only sought to re-
establish a normal price differential between his own product and that
of the competitor, following an apparently lawful price reduction by that
competitor.
IV. THE CASES32
A. In the Matter of Pure Oil Company
The Pure Oil Company sold gasoline to approximately 120 inde-
pendent retail dealers in Jefferson County (Birmingham), Alabama.3
In October, 1955, two non-major retail outlets reduced their prices sub-
stantially below the two-cent differential at which they customarily com-
peted with the majors. Pure and the other majors allowed their dealers
in the county to purchase gasoline at reduced prices under the ordinary
competitive price allowance (CPA) plan. This allowed the majors'
dealers in Jefferson County to post a retail price of one to two cents
above that of the non-majors during the price war. The market returned
to normal on December 28 or 29.
From October, 1953, to July, 1955, the market share of Pure and
its retail dealers in Jefferson County dropped from eleven per cent to ten
per cent. 4 During the price war in the fall of 1955, the Pure dealers er-
perienced an increase in their market share whenever they set their prices
one cent above the non-majors. At the end of the price war, Pure sug-
gested that all 120 of its branded dealers in the county post a retail price
within one cent of the non-majors." The company established a county-
a complaint with the Planning and Coordination Committee before matching the al-
legedly unlawful price. N.R.A. CODE OF FAIR COMPETITION FOR THE PETROLEUM INDUS-
TRY 12 (1933). Perhaps the N.R.A. Code more realistically examined the retailing of
gasoline and concluded that a retailer should be able to match an unlawful price cut,
since the demand for a particular retailer's gasoline is highly elastic. The price match-
ing would not be in retaliation, but out of economic necessity, since sales diminish at a
rapid rate before the Conmmission has time to act.
32. This section is designed to present a bare outline of the cases which form the
basis of this note. The facts have been reduced to those necessary to permit some
general observations to be drawn without, it is hoped, distorting their validity.
33. FTC Proposed Findings, Conclusions and Order, p: 6, In the Matter of Pure
Oil Co., No. 6640, FTC (1962).
34. Pure was the third largest seller in the Jefferson County market, exceeded by
Standard Oil Co. (Ky.) and Gulf Oil Co., which had approximately 17.5% and 13% of
the market respectively. Id. at 16.
35. Non-major brand gasoline is generally priced at about two cents per gallon less
than major brand gasoline at the retail level, DE CHIAZEAU AND KAHN, INTEGRATION AND
COMPETITION IN THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY 466 (1959). However, pump prices should
not be considered the only factor since stamps, discounts, premiums and the other give-
aways constitute a "reduction" in price. The Commission argues in all of the cases that
majors are undercutting the non-majors when they price at less than a two-cent dif-
ferential. The basis for the differential is usually given as higher consumer acceptance
established by the majors through national advertising and better service. The argu-
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wide CPA which would permit implementation of this one-cent plan.
The allowance was available to all Pure dealers in the county, whether
or not they did reduce their prices. Thirty of the 120 dealers did post
the lower price on December 29, 1955. Within twenty days, all retailers
in the county were again engaged in a price war, which finally ended on
April 10, 1956. Following this price war, Pure re-established the two
cent differential.
On September 26, 1956, the FTC issued a complaint against Pure,
charging violations of section 5 of the FTC Act and section 2(a) of the
Robinson-Patman Act. The price discrimination count was based on
Pure's charging a lower price to the favored dealers in Jefferson county
than it charged non-favored dealers elsewhere in Alabama and in other
states where Pure operates.3" The section 5 count was based on an al-
leged conspiracy between Pure and its retail dealers to permit Pure to set
the retail prices."
In the hearing examiner's decision, issued September 28, 1962, the
section 5 count was dismissed on a finding that the plan was optional,
and that there was no coercion or conspiracy employed to give Pure con-
trol over the retail prices. The hearing examiner also found that al-
though Pure charged different prices to its dealers in Jefferson county
than to those located outside of Jefferson county, there was no evidence
of injury to the non-favored Pure dealers and thus no secondary line
violation." However, he did find that Pure's discriminatory pricing
practices had substantially lessened competition between Pure's dealers
and their non-major competitors within Jefferson county with the intent
and effect of capturing a larger share of the market. 9 This, the ex-
ment could be made that this ability to charge a higher price is a competitive advantage
earned by the major and there is no justification for requiring them to charge it. How-
ever, assuming arguendo that the non-majors are entitled to this two-cent insulated price
differential when the consumer acceptance does exist, this is no basis for concluding that
it should be required when this acceptance no longer exists. This may be the situation
in the Pure case where there was a steady shift of the market share away from Pure
while the differential was being maintained.
36. Complaint, p. 3, In the Matter of Pure Oil Co., No. 6640, FTC (Sept. 26, 1956).
37. Id. at 4.
38. More specifically, the hearing examiner found that the four retail dealers clos-
est to Jefferson County, sixteen miles from the nearest favored dealers, had greater
sales during the period of the one-cent plan than they had the following year, 1957. In
the Matter of Pure Oil Co., No. 6640, FTC, TRADE REG. REP. 1 16111 at 20930 (Sept.
28, 1962).
39. Pure's share of the market during the months the plan was in effect was:
10.8, 9.9, 9.7, and 10.3%. By the end of 1956, Pure had slipped to 9.1%. The market
share for seven non-majors during the same period was: 8.3, 6.8, 6.3, and 6.7%. By
the end of the year it had risen to 7.1%. The market share for all majors except Pure
was: 54.8, 60.4, 62.2, and 59.0% during the price war, and had gone down to 57.2% by
the end of the year. See FTC Appendices to Proposed Findings, Conclusions and
Order, Table A at xix. In the Matter of Pure Oil Co., No. 6640, FTC (August 1,
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aminer held, constituted a price discrimination within the meaning of
section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, since it injured competition
in general.
The Pure case appears to involve a vertically integrated major oil
company, faced with a declining market share, bringing its assets to the
aid of its dealers in a particular county in an attempt to enhance its
position in the competitive market. The structure of the non-majors in
the market area is not clear, but it is assumed that some are vertically
and/or horizontally integrated, an assumption based on the typical struc-
ture of firms in most market areas of that size. The Commission, as
the case presently stands, is attacking Pure's action because it allegedly
engaged in predatory pricing practices with the effect and intent of ad-
versely affecting Pure's customers' competitors position in the market. 0
B. FTC v. Sun Oil Company
Sun sold gasoline to thirty-eight independent retail dealers in Duval
County (Jacksonville), Florida." In June of 1955, the Super Test Oil
Company, a non-major, opened a competing station at the same inter-
section as a Sun station operated by Gilbert V. McLean. Initially, Super
Test posted its price at two cents below McLean's, but in August it be-
gan a series of sporadic reductions, dropping as much as eight cents be-
low the Sun price. McLean's volume of business decreased substantially,
and he repeatedly asked Sun for a CPA that would enable him to com-
pete. On December 27, 1955, McLean submitted a company form letter
advising Sun that he would have to post a retail pump price of 25.9
cents per gallon in order to remain in business. Sun estimated that the
1962). When placed in graph form, these market shares show that Pure's share runs
on the same general pattern as the non-majors, rising together and falling together
during the period of the one-cent plan. Both run opposite that of the other majors. Id.
Graph C at xxv. This would seem to indicate that Pure and the non-majors were both
gaining customers from the other majors, not from each other, during the early stages
of the price war. When these other majors entered into the price reduction spiral Pure
and the non-majors lost their initial gains and a good deal more. This hardly seems
to substantiate a finding that the one-cent plan enabled Pure to gain a larger share
of the market at the expense of the non-majors. As a matter of fact, the fifty-seventh
proposed finding of counsel supporting the complaint is not that Pure's market share
increased, but that "as a direct result of its one-cent plan, the rate of its market share
decline was retarded in 1956." FTC Proposed Findings, Conclusions and Order, p. 65,
In the Matter of Pure Oil Co., No. 6640, FTC (1962).
40. It must be pointed out that a hearing examiner's initial decision is reviewable
by the Commission. Therefore, the final view of the FTC, as an institution may change.
41. Sun Oil Co. v. FTC, 294 F.2d 465, 467 (5th Cir. 1961). For law journal notes
reviewing the Fifth Circuit decision see 62 CoLuMr. L. REv. 171 (1962) ; 1962 DUKE L.J.
300; 30 FoEI[DAm L. REv. 836 (1962) ; 75 HARv. L. REv. 429 (1961); 57 Nw. U.L. REv.
113 (1962) ; 41 ORE. L. REv. 351 (1962); 36 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 144 (1961) ; 29 U. CHI.
L. REv. 355 (1962); 31 U. CINc. L. REv. 296 (1962); 110 U. PA. L. Ray. 626 (1962)
and 47 VA. L. REV. 1229 (1961).
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minimum margin that would enable its dealer to survive was 3.5 cents.
Thus, unless McLean were able to purchase his gasoline for 22.4 cents
he would be unable to compete. The current tank wagon price at which
Sun sold gasoline to Duval County dealers was 24.1 cents. Sun, there-
fore, allowed McLean a 1.7 cent CPA, or reduction from the then pre-
vailing tank wagon price, resulting in a 22.4 cents price to him. The
price was not reduced to the other thirty-seven Sun dealers in Duval
County, since the regional manager's report led Sun to believe that they
were not under a competitive hardship at that time." On February 16,
1956, several other majors entered the skirmish by reducing their prices
to all of their dealers in the area, and Sun followed with a CPA for all
of its Duval County dealers. Despite this action by Sun, McLean went
out of business on February 18."
On September 28, 1956, the Federal Trade Commission issued a
complaint against Sun, alleging a violation of the Robinson-Patman Act
by charging a lower price to McLean than to the other Sun dealers in
Duval County." This resulted, alleged the Commission, in diverting
customers from the non-favored Sun dealers to McLean. The complaint
also charged that Sun had violated section 5 of the FTC Act by con-
spiring with McLean to set his retail price.45
The Commission found that both acts had been violated, and re-
jected Sun's 2(b) "meeting competition" defense on the ground that
such defense was not available to the seller when the competition which
it sought to meet was that of its buyer." Thus, Super Test would have
had to offer to sell gasoline to McLean at a lower price than Sun if Sun
were to come within the 2(b) defense.4 Even if it were available in a
case of the buyer's competition, the Commission found that McLean had
reduced his price to within one cent of Super Test instead of maintaining
the usual two cent differential, thus beating rather than meeting com-
petition.48
42. 294 F.2d 465, 469 (5th Cir. 1961).
43. McLean was not the only suffering Sun dealer in Duval County in early 1956.
It appears that at least three others went out of business during the price war. 371 U.S.
at 510.
44. Sun Oil Co. v. FTC, 294 F.2d 465, 470 (5th Cir. 1961).
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid.
47. This, of course, would not happen since the industry is practically devoid of
"split pump" stations. See note 11 supra. Thus, the Commission's interpretation would
completely do away with the defense in this type of industry organization.
48. The problem, apparently not extensively considered by the Commission, is the
division between meeting and beating the price of a competitor. Where a price is used
aggressively to gain new customers, the Commission reasons, it constitutes beating a
competitor's price. However, if it is used defensively to retain customers it constitutes
meeting a competitor's price. The question could be raised as to what point in time the
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The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit set aside the Commis-
sion's cease and desist order in an opinion that criticized the Commis-
sion's "doctrinaire approach" to the good faith defense.4" The opinion
noted that this represented a complete change from the view previously
held by the Commission." The court held that the 2(b) defense was
available to Sun because Super Test, being a vertically integrated firm,
was in competition with Sun as well as with Sun's dealers. The court
also held that Sun had met and not undercut Super Test's price and that
there was no substantial evidence of a price fixing conspiracy."1
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and, in a narrowly
circumscribed opinion, reinstated the Commission's view that the section
2 (b) defense was not available to Sun.52 Mr. Justice Goldberg pointed
out that the record revealed only that Super Test was a horizontally in-
tegrated chain of sixty-five retail stations.5 Therefore, the court of ap-
peals' assumption that Super Test was a vertically integrated supplier-
retailer was not supported by the record. Furthermore, there was no evi-
dence that Super Test's supplier had granted it any price reduction. 4 The
retention relates. If McLean were entitled to retain or attempt to retain those cus-
tomers he had before the price cutting started, he might have had to cut his price below
the two-cent differential in order to attract back those customers who had already
switched to Super Test. If he could seek to retain only the customers he had left in
December, when he reduced his price, the two-cent differential should be enforced. How-
ever, a series of short price wars initiated by Super Test could, under the latter inter-
pretation, leave McLean without any more customers to retain.
49. Sun Oil Co. v. FTC, 294 F.2d 465, 473 (5th Cir. 1961).
50. Id. at 481 n.42.
51. Id. at 481-84.
52. No review was sought of the Fifth Circuit findings that there was no price
fixing conspiracy or that Sun had only met the price of Super Test. Therefore, the
Supreme Court refused to discuss these questions, and the Fifth Circuit decision on
them is final. 371 U.S. 511.
53. Id. at 512.
54. Ibid. The Court said:
Were it otherwise, i.e., if it appeared either that Super Test were an integrated
supplier-retailer, or that it had received a price cut from its own supplier-
presumably a competitor of Sun--we would be presented with a different case,
as to which we herein neither express nor intimate any opinion.
Id. at 512, n.7.
The Court went on to expressly note that its disposition on the facts presented by
the record was not meant to prejudice Sun's right to apply to the FTC to reopen the
record. Then Sun could offer evidence to show that Super Test was vertically inte-
grated or had received a price cut from its supplier, if such is the case. This would
then present the Commission with the question which the Supreme Court found was not
presented. 31 U.S.L. WEEK 4055, 4062 n.20 (U.S. Jan. 174, 1963) (deleted in preliminary
print of U.S. Reports).
The separate memorandum of Mr. Justice Harlan, in which Mr. Justice Stewart
joined, would have remanded the case to the Commission for further evidence rather
than requiring Sun to make application to reopen the record. While recognizing that
Sun had the burden of proof to establish the defense and must bear the responsibility
for any gaps in the record, the memorandum went on to say, "it is equally true that we
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court summarized the problem by saying:
So long as the price-cutter does not receive a price "break" from
his own supplier, his lawful reductions in price are presumably
a function of his own superior merit and efficiency. To permit
a competitor's supplier to bring his often superior economic
power to bear narrowly and discriminatorily to deprive the
otherwise resourceful retailer of the very fruits of his efficiency
and convert the normal competitive struggle between retailers
into an unequal contest between one retailer and the combina-
tion of another retailer and his supplier is hardly an element
of reasonable and fair competition."
C. In the Matter of American Oil Company
American marketed its gasoline through nine independent retail
dealers in the Smyrna-Marietta, Georgia area."8 In or before October
10, 1958, Paraland, apparently a non-major, opened a new station across
the street from a Shell brand station. Shell granted its dealer a CPA
to enable him to charge the same price as Paraland. The price disturb-
ance spred rapidly through the Smyrna community. As the sales of
American's dealers began to be adversely affected, American granted
them CPAs on an individual basis, but only after one or more majors
had done so with respect to stations in the same vicinity." The initial
price allowance by American took place on October 13. By October 27,
the lower prices had extended to Marietta, some four miles away, and
American granted CPAs to its dealers there.
On November 23, 1960, the FTC issued a complaint against Amer-
ican charging a violation of section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act.
The alleged discrimination consisted of selling gasoline at lower prices
to its Smyrna dealers than to its Marietta dealers over the fourteen-day
period."
The Commission, in a four-to-one decision, substantially adopted
are here dealing with an extremely difficult question arising under a singularly opaque
and elusive statute." 371 U.S. at 530.
55. Id. at 522. One observation should be made at this point. The fact that Super
Test is a horizontally integrated chain apparently brings it within the Moore v. Mead's
Fine Bread doctrine. See text accompanying note 18 supra. If Super Test posted a
lower price at this station than it did at its other sixty-four stations, it may have been
open to litigation by the FTC or to a treble damage suit by Sun or McLean or both.
56. Brief of Respondent Before FTC, p.2, In the Matter of American Oil Co.,
No. 8183, FTC (1962).
57. Id. at S.
58. Complaint, p. 3, In the Matter of American Oil Co., No. 8183, FTC (Nov. 23,
1960).
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the hearing examiner's initial decision finding a violation of the act.
Following its reasoning in the Sun case, the Commission again denied
that the 2 (b) good faith meeting of competition defense was applicable."
Furthermore, the Commission reasoned, even if the defense were ap-
plicable to this situation, it would not be available to American because
the price of Shell, which American was attempting to meet, was an il-
legal price." Thus, the American Oil Co. case appears to represent the
Commission's view that an integrated supplier cannot grant CPAs to its
dealers, when they are faced with price cutting majors and non-majors,
without precisely drawing the boundaries of the relevant market so as to
eliminate possible adverse effects on its other dealers.6 Moreover, it
appears that the Commission will search out any adverse effects which
may possibly result from the price discrimination, rather than assess the
over-all reasonableness of the seller's attempts to define a market within
which to allow price reductions. The stress would appear to be more on
correct delimitations at the peril of the seller, rather than on reasonable
delimitations, under all the circumstances.62
D. In the Matter of Atlantic Refining Company
As has previously been noted, retail filling stations presently include
"about 8,000 of the new and rapidly growing 'commission type' stations
run as independent businesses except that they buy [i.e., receive] their
gasoline [as agents] on consignment, thus giving the supplier control
over prices. . . . "" In part, this development has been prompted by the
Commission's view that the Robinson-Patman and FTC Acts prohibit
59. The Commission also rejected American's "changing conditions" defense. In
the Matter of American Oil Co., No. 8183, FTC, TADE REG. RE. 15961 at 20788
(Nov. 24, 1961).
60. Id. at 20788. There are some indications that Paraland is owned by or affili-
ated with Phillips Petroleum Company, a major. In the Matter of American Oil Co.,
No. 8183, FTC, TRADE REG. REP. ff 15961 at 20793 (Nov. 24, 1961) (Comm'r Elman,
dissenting). If this is so, the American case may indirectly present the question of the
availability of the good faith defense to meet the price of a vertically integrated firm,
the question which the Supreme Court was not presented by the record in the Sun case.
This is so because American met the price of Shell, a vertically integrated firm, and
Shell met the price of Paraland, a vertically integrated firm. If the lawful requirement
is read into section 2(b), the Seventh Circuit will be called upon to determine if Shell's
price, which American was attempting to meet, was lawful.
61. An appeal to set aside the Commission's order is presently pending before the
Seventh Circuit. Letter from Walter T. Kuhlmey (of Counsel for the Respondent) to
the author, October 12, 1962.
62. In the Sun case, the Supreme Court says that prices can be reduced on less
than a nationwide scale if the market area is properly defined to mitigate or eliminate
the anti-competitive effects. In determining the lawfulness of these market definitions
"both the Federal Trade Commission and the courts must make realistic appraisals of
relevant competitive facts." 371 U.S. at 527.
63. WHITNEY, op. cit. supra note 10, at 126.
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activity such as that found in the Pure, Sun and A'nerican cases. The
commission or consignment plan, however, has not escaped challenge by
the Federal Trade Commission.
Atlantic was engaged in selling gasoline to forty-nine independent
dealers in the "Delmarva Peninsula" area, composed of portions of the
states of Delaware, Maryland and Virginia. 4 During 1957, a number
of price wars occurred in this market. Atlantic, from time to time, made
surveys of competitive conditions. A survey made on June 25, 1957,
indicated that most major oil companies' outlets were retailing gasoline
at 26.9 cents per gallon, while the Atlantic dealers were selling at about
29.9 cents. Believing that its dealers would be unable to survive the
price disturbance on their own resources, Atlantic offered to put its con-
signment plan into effect.
The dealers had the option to: (1) continue to purchase gasoline
from Atlantic at the current tank wagon price; (2) execute an agree-
ment, terminable at the dealer's option, to become consignees of Atlantic's
gasoline at a fixed commission of twenty-three per cent of the service
station price excluding taxes or (3) terminate all existing contractual
relations with Atlantic." Since the current tank wagon price was 24.3
cents and the current competitive retail price was 26.9 cents, the dealers,
as purchasers, would have been able to realize a 2.6 cents margin. 0
Under the consignment plan, which all but one dealer accepted, the com-
mission would amount to 4.3 cents at the current price level. The con-
signment plan remained in effect until the price war ended in the summer
of 1958.
The FTC, on April 13, 1959, issued a complaint against Atlantic
because of the Delmarva situation."' The first count alleged that the
dealers were coerced to enter the consignment agreements at commissions
less than their "usual and customary" margin of profit,6" and that these
64. In the Matter of Atlantic Refining Co., No. 7471, FTC, TRADE REG. REP.
15786 at 20601 (March 7, 1962).
65. Id. at 15. The agreement signed by the dealers incorporated the normal legal
requisites of such a contract including retention of title by Atlantic; money received to
be held in trust; expenses of delivery, loss, taxes and removal to be paid by Atlantic; and,
upon termination, the dealer had the option to purchase the remaining gasoline inventory
from Atlantic or order its removal. This apparently brought the plan within the
agency doctrine laid down in United States v. General Electric, 272 U.S. 476 (1926).
66. In the Matter of Atlantic Refining Co., No. 7471, FTC, TRADE REG. REP. 1
15783 at 20601 (March 7, 1962).
67. Id. at 20599.
68. Ibid. This allegation appears to be inconsistent with the economics of the con-
signment plan. Probably the Commission was referring to the "usual and customary"
dealer margin if the tank wagon price remained at 24.3 cents and the dealers continued
to post a pump price of 29.9 cents. This seems to ignore the fact that the dealers could
not continue to post a pump price of 29.9 cents and survive in the price war.
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agreements enabled Atlantic to control the retail prices. Count two al-
leged that Atlantic, and its dealers as unnamed co-conspirators, had con-
spired to fix prices through the use of sham consignment agreements.0
Both courses of conduct were alleged to violate section 5 of the FTC Act.
The hearing examiner concluded that Atlantic had utilized a legal
method of procedure in meeting the competitive situation. As a result,
he dismissed counts one and two of the complaint.70
Thus, as the Atlantic case presently stands, "' an integrated oil com-
pany is permitted to offer to make its dealers consignment agents during
the price wars, giving the integrated supplier control over the retail price
and permitting the assets of the integrated supplier to support the dealer.
However, if coercion is used to compel the dealers to accept such a plan,
it will be held unlawful.
V. THE RATIONALE OF ENFORCEMENT
It is apparent from an analysis of the above cases that the FTC has
adopted a case by case approach to the pricewar problem. Relying pri-
marily on section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, but using section 5
of the FTC Act as a potential "catch-all," the Commission has issued
complaints alleging both primary and secondary line price discrimination
violations as well as the use of unfair methods of competition in price
war situations. The effectiveness of this multiple approach to the price
war problem in securing conclusions adverse to respondents is demon-
strated by the fact that in at least one case (Pitre), the hearing examiner,
when unable to find either a primary or secondary line violation, was able
to find what has been characterized in this note as a "third line" violation.
While the case by case approach has the advantage of permitting
the FTC a great deal of flexibility in meeting varying fact situations, its
value is seriously undermined by a lack of consistency and a failure to
69. Ibid. Atlantic also distributed its products through independent wholesalers or
jobbers, who then sold to independent retail dealers. This method of selling both directly
with the retail dealers and through jobbers in the same market area is termed "dual
distribution." Count three of the complaint alleged, and the hearing examiner found,
that Atlantic had coerced these jobbers and their dealers to set prices which corresponded
with those set by Atlantic under the consignment plan. This portion of the case was
omitted from the text because it was desired to emphasize the consignment plan as a
competitive device. For a similar situation, in which the initial decision of the hearing
examiner found that coercion was used, at a time when there was no price war, in
order to force unwilling independent retail dealers to accept a consignment agreement
which resulted in immediately lowering their income see In the Matter of Sun Oil Co.
No. 6934, FTC, TRADE REG. REP. 1 15909 (May 17, 1962).
70. In the Matter of Atlantic Refining Co., No. 7471, FTC, TRADE REG. REP.
15786 at 20602 (March 7, 1962).
71. The dismissal by a hearing examiner is not final. The case is presently pend-
ing before the Commission.
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develop guidelines for the petroleum industry. As a result of the com-
plaints in the above cases, for instance, cease and desist orders were issued
prohibiting an integrated supplier from selectively reducing its price to
dealers in order to counter (1) a decreasing share of the market (Pure),
(2) price cuts by a non-major retail chain (Sun) and (3) price cuts by
major and non-major stations (Anerican) where an adverse effect on
competition in a relevant market could be found. The relevant market,
in turn, has been found to extend beyond the favored buyers where a
CPA was granted to (1) a single dealer (Sun) or (2) all the dealers in
a single small city close to another one (American), but properly defined
when the CPA was granted to all the dealers within a county (Pure).
Finally, in a fact situation distinguishable in form but not in substance
from that found in the other price war cases, the hearing examiner found
no price discrimination or use of unfair methods of competition and dis-
missed the complaint (Atlantic). If not inconsistent, the cases certainly
fail to provide any indication of a uniform approach to the price war
problem.
The cases, moreover, give no indication of who, in a price war
situation, will be subjected to proceedings by the Commission. In the
Pure case, the complaint was issued against a major oil company which
made the initial price reduction in the market in an attempt to offset its
declining market share. The Sun case involved a major which reduced
its price in order to meet price cuts by a non-major retail chain. Ameri-
can and Atlantic reduced their prices only after other majors as well as
non-majors had reduced theirs. One noticeable consistency is that all
of these complaints have been issued against major oil companies. While
the majors have more assets to bring to bear in a price war, the non-major
retail chains or vertically integrated firms do have the ability to discrim-
inate in price in order to start or continue a price war.
7 "2
The Commission acknowledges that there is no instance in which
any litigation has been instituted against a non-major for violation of
the Robinson-Patman Act, but explains that:
This is not because of any policy of the Federal Trade Com-
72. It is possible that this serious problem has been appreciated by the Commission.
A complaint was issued against the Crown Central Petroleum Company, a non-major
integrated into all phases of the industry, on October 19, 1962. Count one of the com-
plaint asserts that through various provisions in the leases, subleases and supply contracts
with its independent dealers, Crown Central has retained and exercised the power to
compel uniform pricing, in violation of § 5 of the FTC Act.
Count two alleges that Crown Central further violated § 5 by selling below cost,
in that it initiated a plan of selling gasoline to its Baltimore, Maryland, dealers at
a price of 3.4 cents per gallon on and after June 12, 1962. Complaint, p. 5, In the Mat-
ter of Crown Central Petroleum Co., No. 8539, FTC (Oct. 19, 1962).
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mission, but merely due to the fact that operations of these con-
cerns, insofar as their dealer relationships are concerned, do not
lend themselves to this type of practice. In the majority of in-
stances, the dealers of the so called "independent" or "private
brand" companies are salaried employees."3
This would appear to be an artificially narrow view of the scope of the
Robinson-Patman Act. The non-majors frequently sell or purchase
their supplies in interstate commerce. If they price their gasoline higher
at one retail outlet than at another there is a price differential from the
standpoint of the consumer. If the price differential is in the course of
interstate commerce and results in injuring the competitive position of
independent retail dealers, major or non-major, the result is the same
general injury to competition as supports the hearing examiner's deci-
sion in the Pure case. When the non-majors have only contractual ar-
rangements with retail outlets,", they are subject to the same secondary
line criteria as the majors. It would appear, therefore, that the Robinson-
Patman Act would be inapplicable only when the non-major operated
wholly within a state or uniformly reduced its prices at all of its retail
outlets, just as it would be if a major oil company did the same on a
nationwide scale.
In the Sun and American cases, involving injury to the non-favored
customers of the sellers, the Commission has emphasized the need to cor-
rectly define the relevant geographic market so as to avoid diverting cus-
tomers from non-favored retailers. On the basis of the particular facts
presented, the Commission found an improper market delimitation where
the CPA was granted to a single dealer (Sun) and to all dealers in a city
(American)." While the facts may support the findings of secondary
line injury, the Commission appears to be giving an unnecessarily ex-
panded interpretation to the relevant market in this type of case. Cer-
tainly neither the mapjors nor the non-majors should be permitted to
proceed arbitrarily in judging the relevant market. However, in view-
ing the legality of a market delimitation, the Commission should take in-
to account the fact that the seller must proceed in a highly dynamic situa-
tion, with retail prices often changing hourly, and must make a predic-
73. Letter from John V. Buffington (Assistant to the Chairman, Federal Trade
Commission) to the author, November 15, 1962.
74. This appears to be the case involved in the recent complaint against the Crown
Central Petroleum Co. See note 72 supra.
75. While the hearing examiner did approve the market delimitation by Pure on a
countrywide basis, this merely precluded finding a violation of the secondary line count.
Since the complaint was in the statutory language, the hearing examiner was still able
to base his decision on injury to competition in general.
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tion of countless variables. The fact that a limited number of consumers
later drive a few miles out of their way in order to save a cent a gallon
should not conclusively establish that the market was improperly de-
fined .7 In these secondary line cases, the Commission should accept rea-
sonable attempts to draw market boundaries. If, however, as the Pure
case indicates, the secondary line charge is merely included in cases
where the real concern is for competition in general, in order to prove a
technical violation, the charge should be dispensed with. The Commis-
sion should concentrate instead on developing a body of law to protect
the general competitive vigor of the market.
A particularly serious failing in the cases examined is presented by
the hearing examiner's decision in the Atlantic case. It stresses form
over substance and can only lead to needless delay in developing a coher-
ent solution to the price war problem. The gasoline retail consignment
plan represents nothing but an on again, off again contractual facade
intended to enable an integrated firm to continue the practices condemned
by the Supreme Court in the Sun case, and which should not be permitted
to obscure the real nature of the law in this area. The competitive in-
jury made possible by acceptance of this consignment plan is not elimin-
ated by the fact that the dealers entered into it voluntarily. Without in-
tending to reflect on the merits of Atlantic's attempt to assist its retail
dealers, it is submitted that the Commission should reject the hearing
examiner's application of the agency doctrine.7
The problem of enforcement, however, goes even deeper. The case
by case method, when narrowly employed, has serious shortcomings.
Rather than promote the development of a comprehensible body of law,
the Commission, in the seven years since issuing the Pure and Sun com-
plaints, has handed down highly technical decisions which deal only with
the facts presented. They contain little, if any, assistance in developing
standards of conduct for businessmen who desire to comply with the
76. This may be particularly true in the kind of situation presented in the Sum and
Amcricam cases where the price wars are actually in progress when the company is faced
with the market delimitation problem. The whole question may be rendered moot by
the business failure of the dealers before a company representative can accurately meas-
ure the economic consequences of a given price reduction.
77. See note 65 supra. Subsequent to the preparation of this Note, the FTC did in
fact reject that part of hearing examiner's opinion approving of the consignment plan,
saying in part:
[W]here the antitrust acts are involved, the crucial fact is the impact of the
particular practice upon competition, not the label it carries. . . . [T]he result
must turn not on the skill with which counsel has manipulated the concept of
"sale" and "agency," but on the significance of the business practices in terms
of restraint of trade. . ..
In the Matter of Atlantic Oil Co., No. 7471, FTC, TRADE REG. REP. 1 16422 at 21289
(May 16, 1963).
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law."8 The absence of such guidance for compliance delays the effective
curtailment of the price wars, while substantially increasing the need for
use of the Commission's mandatory enforcement machinery.
The ideal start towards the development of a comprehensive ra-
tionale of enforcement would be an economic survey of the petroleum
industry which would build up an adequate picture and develop the causal
factors in price wars. However, this would probably take years to ac-
complish if and when the required funds could be secured from the Con-
gress. Therefore, it is more realistic to talk in terms of the Commis-
sion's Bureau of Economics making as extensive a study of the eco-
nomics of price wars as its manpower and funds might permit. Per-
haps one source of men and money would be to decrease the emphasis
placed on detailed economic studies to support individual complaints.
The appendices to the proposed findings in the Pure case contain over
one hundred pages of tables, charts and graphs designed to support the
Commission's position in the case. Consideration should be given to
placing more emphasis on a general study, which should then be reviewed
and brought up to date periodically.
Using the economic study as a basis, the Commission should formu-
late an overall policy designed to deal with the problem. A central
authority, perhaps the Program Review Officer, should then be given the
task, and the commensurate authority and staff, to review the work of
both the voluntary and mandatory enforcement branches of the Com-
mission's organization to determine whether and how an adequate policy
may be carried forward.
Once some guidelines have been developed with the Commission,
the industry should be made aware of their general nature. This could
be accomplished through any one or a combination of the several volun-
tary compliance procedures presently utilized by the Commission, in-
eluding the Trade Practice Conference Rules, the Industry Guides Pro-
gram or the Trade Regulation Rules. While such generalized policy
formulations cannot be expected to completely clarify such a complex
78. The recent Commission decision in the Atlantic case said:
The Commission is fully aware of the difficulties faced by tradesmen at alllevels of commerce when price wars erupt in the sale of gasoline. It is
realized that efforts often are made by some supplies to cooperate with and
assist their dealers in various ways so as to enable them to compete in the
course of price wars. However, in doing so they should avoid transgressions
of the antitrust laws. A seller may apply to the Commission for advice on
appropriate, legal methods for meeting the problem in the particular circum-
stances it faces.
Id. at 21291. In view of the dynamic nature of a price war and the delay inherent in
obtaining an advisory opinion, it is doubtful if this advice will be of much assistance
to the industry.
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problem, if carefully drawn, they can provide at least a broad outline by
which businessmen can gauge their conduct, and can indicate what type
of activity the Commission presently finds objectionable."9
These constitute general recommendations for bringing about volun-
tary compliance. This, however, cannot be expected to end the price
war problem. There will continue to be both intentional and uninten-
tional non-compliance and, therefore, there will be a continuing need
for mandatory enforcement of the law. Administrative proceedings are
expensive and time consuming and may unwisely divert energy from
other areas of work. Therefore, any litigation which is not in further-
ance of the formulated Commission enforcement program is wasteful.
Because of this, all future requests for the Commission to issue a com-
plaint should be carefully evaluated to determine the role of a possible
proceeding in effectuating the goals of the program. Each complaint
issued by the Commission should be a key part in a comprehensive plan
to eliminate retail price wars in the petroleum industry. It is, of course,
impossible to estimate accurately how much of this selectivity was ex-
ercised in the petroleum cases examined. It is suggested, however, that
careful attention should be given to complaints in the future and those
cases that do not meet the standard of furthering the overall enforce-
ment program should be left to private treble damage or injunction suits.
A method of extending mandatory enforcement would be closer co-
operation with the states. A number of states presently have statutes
against selling below cost " or against price discrimination8' which are or
could be applied to the gasoline price wars. In the absence of such a
statute, the Commission could co-operate with groups seeking to pass
them by furnishing information. This effort at state co-operation could
be particularly effective where the state laws cover those firms operat-
ing solely in intrastate commerce which the Commission is unable to
reach.
The general nature of many of the suggestions in this note under-
scores the complexity of the problem and emphasizes the fact that there
is no easy solution. The Commission is not endeavoring to destroy a
group or groups within the petroleum industry. It is attempting to
referee the competitive struggle for consumers' dollars by attacking cer-
tain business excesses. There is little doubt that there is need for im-
79. For example, the Commission might have saved itself a costly proceeding if it
had made a formal announcement of its recently announced views on consignment plans
prior to the price var in the Atlantic case.
80. 5 CALLMAN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKs, appendix
IV (Supp. 1961).
81. Id., appendix V.
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provement in the Commission's program. However, there can be even
less doubt that there is a real need for someone to supervise this com-
petitive struggle. Given the structure of the industry, unrestricted price
competition at the retail level would not serve the best interests of the
public or of the oil companies concerned.
EFFECTIVE GUIDANCE THROUGH CEASE AND DESIST
ORDERS: THE T-V COMMERCIAL
Even before the advent of the television commercial, regulation of
false and misleading advertising represented one of the Federal Trade
Commission's most expensive and time consuming tasks.' Additional
problems have been presented to the Commission during the past fifteen
years2 as the infant television medium grew, if not to adulthood, at least
to adolescence. The phenomenal growth of the television medium is
demonstrated by the fact that in 1949 the amount spent for television
advertising amounted to only about one per cent of the total spent for
advertising in all media, while in 1961, television advertising accounted
for thirteen per cent of all advertising expenditures.' In 1960, suspect-
ing that the new medium might become a juvenile delinquent if not care-
fully disciplined, the Federal Trade Commission gave its widest attention
to eliminating deception in television commercials.4
Television has been described as the most effective selling tool ever
developed for reaching a mass audience at low cost.' In 1958 it was
estimated that 48,300,000 television sets were in use,6 with about 25,000,-
000 people viewing the average network evening program.7 As an
authoritative medium it carries considerable weight.' A 1951 study
showed that sixty-five per cent of the television owners interviewed con-
1. Moore, Deceptive Trade Practices and the Federal Trade Commission, 28 TENN.
L. Rxv. 493, 503 (1960).
2. Commercial TV started its first full year of operation in the United States in
1946. MCMAHAN, TV TAPE COMMERCIALS 11 (1960).
3. The total amount spent for television advertising in 1949 amounted to $57,800,000,
while in 1961 $1,615,000,000 was spent on advertising in this medium, or almost thirty
times as much. The amount spent for advertising in all media increased from $5,202,-
200,000 in 1949 to $11,845,000,000 in 1961, or only a little over twice as much. Guide to
Marketing for 1963, Printer's Ink, August 31, 1962, p. 384-85.
4. 1960 FTC ANN. RP. 6
5. MCMAHAN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 43.
6. DIRKSEN & KROEGER, ADVERTISING PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS 241 (1960).
7. MCMAHAN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 43.
8. BOGERT, THE AGE OF TELEVISION 195 (1956).
